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An avian inﬂ  uenza quality assurance program was used 
to provide information for laboratories on the sensitivity and 
speciﬁ  city of their avian inﬂ  uenza nucleic acid testing. Most 
laboratories were able to correctly detect clinically relevant 
amounts of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1), and results improved as 
each subsequent panel was tested.
H
ighly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1) 
is endemic among the world’s wild bird populations 
and continued to spread during 2006 to poultry across Asia, 
Africa, and mainland Europe (1,2). Sensitive, speciﬁ  c diag-
nostic methods are essential for early accurate detection of 
HPAI virus in the prepandemic and early pandemic phases 
in countries where no cases have been recorded, such as 
Australia (3).
Several sublineages of HPAI (H5N1) exist (4,5). Virus 
mutation requires that nucleic acid testing (NAT) methods 
such as reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) be continually 
improved to remain sensitive for emerging strains (6–12). 
Currently, the World Health Organization (WHO) recom-




We report results from an avian inﬂ  uenza quality as-
surance program (QAP) that used an established, Internet-
based quality assurance reporting system (www.rcpaqap.
com.au/serology), allowing remote data entry, rapid result 
dissemination, and expert comment. The QAP provided 
feedback to laboratories on NAT characteristics (PCR ac-
curacy, sensitivity, and speciﬁ  city), reporting optimization, 
and assessment of continuously updated laboratory-devel-
oped NAT methods.
During 2006, three panels of specimens were distrib-
uted to 29 participating laboratories: 15 from Australia 
(including 4 veterinary laboratories); 2 from Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of Chi-
na; 5 from Singapore; 1 from New Caledonia; 1 from Ma-
laysia; and 5 from New Zealand. The panels consisted of 
an Indonesian and a Vietnamese strain of avian inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1), originally isolated from humans and grown 
in MDCK cells. Viral copy numbers were estimated by 
comparing real-time RT-PCR crossing-point values to a 
standard curve generated by using plasmid standards; the 
amplicon was cloned into pGEMT-Easy (Promega, Madi-
son, WI, USA). Plasmid standard concentrations were es-
timated as described previously (13) and as recommended 
by the LightCycler manufacturer (Roche, Indianapolis, IN, 
USA). Sensitivity of NATs was determined with a range 
of clinically relevant nucleic acid concentrations of both 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) strains (103 to 10–1 copies/μL) to enable 
laboratories to assess limit of detection (LOD) of their as-
says. Speciﬁ  city was assessed by inclusion of other inﬂ  u-
enza strains and a negative control (Table 1). All strains 
and MDCK cells were inactivated by exposure to 50 KGy 
of γ-irradiation, except for strain A (H7N4), which was in-
activated by the addition of lysis buffer (14).
Four experiments to deﬁ  ne optimum conditions were 
conducted. 1) LOD determinations, with a dilution series of 
all strains, were tested by using real-time RT-PCR (15). 2) 
Transport media were compared by using serial dilutions of 
inactivated inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) in phosphate-buffered 
saline with gelatin (with antimicrobial agents) (PBSG), TE 
buffer, and buffer RLT (lysis) (QIAGEN, Valencia, CA, 
USA), placed at –80°C, –20°C, +4°C, +25°C, and +37°C 
for 10 days. Each day, 1 tube at each temperature condition 
was removed, and viral DNA was extracted by using the 
QIAamp viral RNA minikit (QIAGEN) and tested with a 
real-time RT-PCR (15). 3) For further stability testing, a 
test panel diluted in PBSG was sent by courier from Sydney 
to Hong Kong, held by Australian customs for 7 days, and 
returned unopened 15 days after dispatch. The temperature 
range the shipped panel was exposed to is unknown; how-
ever, previous temperature loggers have recorded tempera-
tures from 22°C to 33°C. The panel that traveled was tested 
against a panel that had been stored optimally (–80°C) (15). 
No difference was detected in the amount of virus in the 
specimens that traveled compared with optimally stored 
specimens, indicating that the specimens were stable under 
normal transport conditions (results not shown). 4) Homo-
geneity was established before distribution by having the 
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panel tested and approved by 2 reference laboratories (Vic-
torian Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Melbourne, Victo-
ria, Australia; Western Australian Centre for Pathology and 
Medical Research, Perth, Western Australia, Australia) and 
1 animal reference laboratory (Elizabeth Macarthur Agri-
cultural Institute, Camden, New South Wales, Australia).
For each panel the samples were diluted in PBSG and 
transported by courier at ambient temperature in 3 seasons 
(autumn, winter, summer). Participants were not required 
to use a certain NAT method. Participants were asked for 
information on methods used, including extraction and RT-
PCR protocol and primer/probe sequences. A total of 780 
results were analyzed, and a report was issued to partici-
pants within 3 weeks of each survey closing, well before 
the next panel shipment. This allowed participants to adjust 
their testing procedures if necessary before the next survey 
began. Results were reported by participants as positive, 
negative, or equivocal. For simplicity, we report equivo-
cal results as positive, given that participating laboratories 
retest an equivocal result and generally do not report such 
results as negative. On average for the 3 panels, 2.6% of 
results were reported as equivocal.
Panel 1 contained 8 specimens, which included 2 dilu-
tions (103 and 101 copies/μL) of each subtype H5N1 strain 
(Table 1). Only 35% of participants correctly identiﬁ  ed all 
samples; 95% reported a correct result for the highest con-
centration of both subtype H5N1 strains (103 copies/μL); 
70% could detect the lower concentration (101 copies/μL). 
Only 46% of participating laboratories used an inﬂ  uenza 
A matrix assay as well as a speciﬁ  c H5 assay (Table 2). 
Laboratories were advised to use both methods in tandem 
to reduce the chance of missing variant inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
strains that might not be detected by their speciﬁ  c H5 as-
say. Some false positives (1.3%) were reported, and some 
confusion regarding terminology occurred: many laborato-
ries reported results as for subtype H5N1 assays, despite 
most of these results being speciﬁ  c for the H5 gene only.
For panel 2, no participants correctly identiﬁ  ed  all 
samples because of the addition of 2 extremely dilute sam-
ples of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) (100 and 10–1 copies/μL) that 
were below the LOD for most laboratories. Eleven percent 
of participants detected 1 strain of HPAI virus (H5N1) by 
using primers speciﬁ  c for H5 or subtype H5N1 at 1 of the 
2 highest dilutions, but not both. In our experience, dilute 
specimens are useful for assessing the LOD of the testing 
system because they may highlight the most sensitive meth-
ods available. The number of laboratories using a generic 
inﬂ  uenza A test, in addition to a speciﬁ  c H5 test, increased 
to 73% (Table 2).
For panel 3, sensitivity of detection improved com-
pared with panel 2: 25% of participants detected a strain 
of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) at the lowest concentrations. 
Sensitivity of H5/H5N1 testing for the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
Vietnamese strain increased over time, while sensitivity of 
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Table 1. Avian influenza quality assurance panel specimen details, Australasia 
Specimen Dilution Copy number/PL
Influenza A (H5N1) Indonesian  1:1,000 6.25 × 10
3
Influenza A (H5N1) Vietnamese  1:1,000 5 × 10
3
Influenza A (H5N1) Indonesian  1:100,000 6.25 × 10
1
MDCK-negative control  1:1,000 NA
Influenza A (H5N1) Vietnamese  1:100,000 5 × 10
1
Influenza A (H3N2) (isolated in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; 
close sequence match to A/Canterbury/29/2005) 
1:1,000 1.25 × 10
2
Influenza B (isolated in Sydney; no sequence information available)  1:1,000 2 × 10
2
Influenza A (H7N4) (A/emu/NSW/97)  1:1,000 1 × 10
4
Influenza A (H5N1) Indonesian*  1:10,000,000 6.25 ×10
–1
Influenza A (H5N1) Vietnamese*  1:10,000,000†  5 × 10
–1
*These dilutions were included in panels 2 and 3 only; NA, not applicable. 
†For panel 3, the dilution for the influenza (H5N1) Vietnamese strain was changed to 1:1,000,000, with a copy number of 5 × 10
0 PL.
Table 2. Summary of avian influenza quality assurance project, Australasia*
Panel
no.† Date
% Correct results, 
Indonesian strain‡
% Correct results, 
Vietnamese strain‡




extraction method  
(% participants)
Most common 
amplification method  
(% participants)
1 2006 Oct 7 87.5 80 46 QIAGEN QIAamp viral 
RNA minikit (50)
QIAGEN Artus 
Influenza/H5 LC RT-PCR 
kit (20)
2 2006 Nov 9 84 84 73 QIAGEN QIAamp viral 
RNA minikit (50)
Invitrogen Superscript III 
qRT-PCR (31)
3 2006 Jun 11 82 88 75 QIAGEN QIAamp viral 
RNA minikit (50)
Invitrogen Superscript III 
qRT-PCR (40)
*RT-PCR, reverse transcription–PCR. 
†Panels 2 and 3 had 2 very low dilutions of subtype H5N1 that were beyond the limit of detection for most laboratories. Percentage of correct results 
reported for the Indonesian and Vietnamese strains, with these results included, is 59 and 59 for panel 2 and 56 and 66 for panel 3, respectively. 
‡Results reported for influenza H5/(H5N1) testing. testing decreased slightly over the 3 panels for the inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) Indonesian strain (Table 2). Laboratories had al-
tered primer/probe sets to increase sensitivity for the Viet-
namese strain, which resulted in decreased sensitivity for 
the Indonesian strain. Sensitivities of other testing methods 
(inﬂ  uenza A, B, H3) increased during subsequent testing of 
each panel (data not shown); the number of correct results 
reported by participants using inﬂ  uenza A matrix testing 
rose from 84% in panel 1 to 91% in panel 3.
Conclusions
Most participants did not disclose their primer/probe 
sequence information, which made it difﬁ  cult to recom-
mend the most sensitive methods to other participants. 
However, during a prepandemic phase, having a range 
of primers/probes being used may be optimal, providing 
inﬂ  uenza A matrix detection is also conducted and QA is 
maintained, until WHO recommends a method to detect 
new pandemic strains.
Participants in the avian inﬂ  uenza QAP made clear im-
provements in the sensitivity and speciﬁ  city of their NAT 
methods over time. It is important to provide continuing 
QA to expose inconsistencies in results or primers that may 
be skewed toward a particular strain.
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